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UK Electricity Market Reform – Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing?

Abstract: The UK Government has published a White paper on Electricity Market Reform which precedes legislation with a declared aim of delivering secure, clean and decarbonised electricity supply. It introduces interventionist methods aiming to promote a nuclear power construction programme, a streamlined renewables programmes and a system to ensure that generation capacity is built to cope with variability in electricity output. However, the policies announced to date are likely to fail to deliver the promised nuclear programme and the system of ‘feed-in tariffs’ announced for renewables is stunted and made less efficient by a desire to integrate it with the prevailing electricity market arrangements. The effect of the changes in the White Paper is likely to be incremental rather than revolutionary.
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1.	Introduction
In theory the UK electricity market is, as a result of a change in Government policy, about to have two decades of market liberalisation at least partly reversed in order to decarbonise the energy economy, with nuclear power being the major winner of the initiative. In reality, however, the reforms, a mishmash of still partly digested and sometimes unworkable mechanisms, may not be streamlined sufficiently to come near achieving its declared objectives of the interests which have propelled the reform forward. 
The UK Government published its proposals on Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in July 2011 in a White Paper (which precedes legislation). The document says:
‘security of supply is threatened as existing plant closes: over the next decade we will lose around a quarter (around 20 GW) of our existing generation capacity as old or more polluting plant close. …. (DECC 2011, 5)…….. 

‘At the heart of our strategy is a framework that will offer reliable contracts, administered through delivery arrangements that are trusted by investors, to achieve the diverse portfolio of generation we need to meet our goals as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible’ (DECC 2011, 6)

The Government was keen to square an apparent circle of trying to reconcile the manifestos of the two Government coalition partners (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) which set themselves against giving subsidies for nuclear power stations with the reality of doing just that by stating: ‘nuclear power stations should receive no public support unless similar support is available to other low-carbon technologies' (DECC 2011, 9).

According to a former (Labour Party) Treasury advisor, Michael Jacobs, ‘The plans finally do away with the liberalised electricity market created by the Thatcher administration a quarter of a century ago’ (Jacobs 2011). How far is this characterisation accurate?
The Government’s initiative consists of four parts; a rising ‘floor carbon price’, so- called ‘contracts for difference’ feed in tariff for nuclear power, a ‘contracts for difference’ feed-in tariff system for renewables and ‘capacity payments’ to ensure there is enough power station capacity. I shall go through these in turn.
2.	Floor Price for carbon
Legislation has already been introduced to levy an energy tax ensure that in the UK the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) delivers a floor price for carbon rising successively to £30 per tonne of carbon by 2020, around three times its level 2010. This would do nothing to promote new non-fossil electricity generation, although it would guarantee extra windfall profits for the existing nuclear generation that is owned by British Energy, a company controlled by Electricité de France (EDF). The proposed carbon price (as with the EU ETS carbon price in general) is not high enough to encourage non-fossil investment, and also there is no certainty that it will continue into the future. In Britain, a Parliament cannot bind future Parliaments. In a privately owned competitive electricity system renewable energy and nuclear energy developers need long term power purchase agreement contracts which are legally enforceable. The point of the carbon floor price is two-fold. First, it provides some political cover for the Government which promised not to subsidise nuclear power. The carbon floor price increases electricity prices for non-fossil fuels thus allowing the Government to claim that this is an incentive available to both renewables and nuclear power. The second point is that the Government will earn tax revenues. In fact the real policy that offers the possibility of financing nuclear power is a type of feed-in tariff.
3.	A nuclear feed-in tariff
The Government will negotiate with nuclear developers and give them long term contracts to supply nuclear energy at a guaranteed price – a Feed-In Tariff (FIT). An issue to be thrashed out is how much detail will be available to the public about the contracts or whether information will be withheld on grounds of commercial confidentiality. Subsidies for nuclear power are controversial. Opinion polls express a general preference for renewable energy as opposed to nuclear power, although a lot of people would prefer not to pay extra for anything at the moment.
The proposed feed-in tariff mechanism is a complex one involving the generators being paid the difference between the contract reference price and the electricity market price at any one time. Hence the name ‘contracts for difference’ (CFD) FIT. Cynics may say that this CFD mechanism is attractive to the Government since it will help obscure the amount of cross-subsidy that will be paid to the nuclear developers and make it difficult to establish how much is being paid to the nuclear generators as distinct from the renewable generators. The cross subsidy will have to be funded by some precept charged to electricity consumer’s bills. However, such details are not spelled out. It seems likely that this precept will be additional and separate to the carbon price levy, the proceeds from which will go to the UK Treasury.
This set of proposals represents an important step forward for pro-nuclear analysts such as Dieter Helm, who criticised the policies of the former Labour Government for advocating new nuclear investment without doing much to encourage it (Helm 2008). However, the argument that nuclear power can be profitably developed if only it was afforded the same subsidies as renewable energy sources like wind power has begun to look shaky. 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC), a Government-appointed body which advises the Government how to achieve cuts of 80 per cent in UK carbon emissions by 2050, concluded that nuclear power was the cheapest low carbon electricity source. The CCC called for the amount of offshore wind power installed to be restricted to being no more than 13 GW by 2020, and preferably less (CCC 2011). The clarity of the CCC’s judgements that nuclear power was cheaper even than onshore wind surprised some. Also surprising was the apparent paradox of  a body (the CCC) charged with achieving very radical carbon reduction objectives calling for the amount of offshore wind development to be curtailed in the short term. 
Yet the CCC is wrong in assessing nuclear power with the same financial risk criteria as wind power. The estimates of nuclear construction costs used by the CCC are challengeable. Crucially, it is doubtful that similar risk estimates (discount rates) could be applied to nuclear as are applied to onshore and even offshore windfarms. The costs of building, and the performance, of new nuclear power stations are highly uncertain compared to windfarms. Pension funds and other institutional investors and banks are likely to demand a rather higher rate of return from a proposed nuclear power station project than from a windfarm proposal. This puts the contract price of power from nuclear up sharply, especially since much nuclear investment has to be made years before any electricity generated and therefore any income earned. Comments from City analysts lend succour to this view.
This bottom line has a sharp political sting. Nuclear power will need more incentives than many types of renewable energy if the power stations are to be built. Hope of major electricity utilities taking the risk of building the first nuclear plant purely out of their own resources is made much less likely by the desire of credit agencies to penalise companies that make what are thought to be uncertain investments. So, in short, the Government will have to: a) be highly cunning in hiding the extra incentives it needs to achieve nuclear construction b) keep to its current stance on subsidies by giving the same incentives (such as loan repayment guarantees) to renewable energy schemes like offshore windfarms as it will offer to nuclear power or c) pretend that everything is fine and hope the lack of progress towards building the nuclear power stations will not become an issue. Option c) may in fact involve less political costs than a) and b). 
Pro-nuclear analysts tend to suggest that in the East nuclear is cheaper to build. Yet in the East the state still largely controls the electricity systems, and  anyway China is building more renewable than nuclear capacity. In the west there has been a shift to liberalised markets. This means that nuclear power becomes a lot more expensive because of its very capital intensive nature. The cost of raising private capital on financial markets is much more expensive than the cost of borrowing using Government-backed bonds. Even EDF’s ability to construct nuclear power stations in France has been sharply constrained because EDF now has to find finance from private financial sources and it is no longer a retail monopolist. Nothing in the UK Government’s proposed Electricity Market Reform (EMR) (to date) suggests anything will be done to alter this type of financial situation. The architecture of market liberalisation is being altered, not trashed. Even the proposal for a renewables feed-in tariff is scarred with an (unnecessary) effort to fit in with the theory of liberalised markets.
4.	Renewable Feed-In Tariffs
Renewable Energy lobbyists were relieved to see that the Government has backed away (for the time being) from its initial suggestions (in the preceding ‘green’ discussion paper) that renewable FIT contracts would be ‘auctioned’ – such schemes, as were tried in the UK in the 1990s, led to the majority of schemes not being implemented because of optimistically low bids and planning consent failure. The Government also relieved the renewables lobby by saying that FITs would be decided on a technology basis rather than simply carved up into one, nuclear dominated, ‘low carbon obligation’. 
Yet the proposed FIT schemes (which will replace the Renewables Obligation from 2017) may still end up as a relatively poor relation of continental FIT schemes. The problem is that the Government seems set on making renewable energy generators sell their electricity markets through its notion of ‘contracts for differences’ (CFD) FITs. This has two big problems. First, contrary to what the Government believe, trading will make a FIT scheme more, not less, expensive than a German-style ‘fixed’ FIT. As Newbery (2011) points out, it is much more cost-effective for The System Operator to balance wind power on a national basis than each windfarm trying to balance its own output. Moreover, the vagaries of the highly complex UK electricity market expose renewable developers to uncertainties and ‘imbalance risk’ about their income. Added to this the electricity suppliers are likely to take their cut amongst the complexity. Hence, using Newbery’s figures the Government’s scheme is likely to add around 10 per cent to the costs of their CFD Fit as opposed to the ‘fixed’, German-style, FIT, this percentage rising as more offshore wind comes on line. The Renewables Obligation (RO) is criticised for its expensive nature compared to the German system because developers had to pay a ‘risk premium’ to investors because of the uncertain income stream under the RO (Mitchell et al 2006; Toke and Lauber 2007). Yet this risk seems likely to return in a new form with the CFD FIT because the Government insist, with the support of the electricity suppliers, that renewable operators have to trade on UK electricity markets.
Things are made even worse because, in practice, only electricity suppliers and large power stations are able to be electricity traders. This means that renewable developers even of up to 100 MW in size will be effectively ineligible to receive the CFD FIT. They will have to go cap in hand to the electricity suppliers themselves and ask for them to give them power purchase agreements. Research on third party contracts and CHP units suggest that electricity suppliers will take upwards of 20 per cent of the income as the price of giving independent developers contracts (Toke and Fragaki 2008). When added to the ‘imbalance’ risks mentioned by Newbery (2011), this means that an independent renewable developer is likely to receive no more than 70 per cent of the stated CFD FIT reference price. 
At least in the case of the Renewables Obligation (RO) independents are free to sell the renewable obligation certificates, and the RO gives a sufficiently generous income flow that even a discount of 25 per cent can still leave developers with profitable schemes. However, the CFD FIT may not be so generous as the RO, and hence there will be less renewable energy development.
5.	Capacity payments
The Government want to establish incentives to provide capacity (either generation or demand response) to deal with what will be, with more renewables, greater variability of output. Given the amount of gas fired power stations coming on line the projections of generating capacity shortage are not as serious as sometimes stated, especially as economic recession is reducing projections of future electricity demand. Capacity additions are still needed, but it does seem that the investment will be mainly in generation capacity with little going on more imaginative schemes involving demand side response measures or the adoption of concepts like the North European Supergird.  The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) White Paper mentions demand side response. However there is limited understanding of the need to invest in infrastructure to assist demand side measures at the commercial and industrial level (for example to mobilise cooling, heating and air conditioning systems for response measures) or, despite the references to ‘smart meters’, to seriously discuss the changes that need to be made to appliances to develop demand side measures at a domestic level. 
The electricity majors will be interested in building power stations, from which they earn money for increased electricity sales, and apart from a few (admittedly energetic) small companies, there are no major institutional players developing demand side response techniques. Despite hopeful sounding Government press releases, the UK Government does not seem to be doing much to press the regulators, the Office of Gas and Electricity Management (OFGEM), to support the North European SuperGrid concept to connect offshore windfarms to international electricity markets.
This discussion shows how nuclear power is more of a barrier than a help to absorbing more renewables. Nuclear power stations are set up to run at full load for as long as they can. Hence they are pretty useless for the purpose of increasing load when the wind is not blowing, and they are not well equipped, on economic if not technical grounds, to ramp down if there is a surfeit of wind on the system.
6.	Conclusion
Despite the bold pronouncements the impact of the Government’s Electricity Market Reform is likely to be much more incremental than revolutionary. Indeed, bar giving extra incentives (some would say handouts) to electricity majors to build gas power stations which often would be constructed anyway, and continuing the renewable energy programme in its traditionally sub-optimal form, little may in fact change. Of course there will be a lot more gas, more renewables, less coal and possibly less nuclear. This is not greatly different from what would happen without the Electricity Market Reform. Carbon capture and storage is a possible saviour for fossil fuels, but currently it has too many uncertainties to be pitched as a major player. 
The aspirations of the nuclear industry for a major nuclear programme are unlikely to materialise. EDF and others may gain planning consents, but the history of nuclear power industry suggests that it is shortage of finance rather than planning failure that is the main barrier for development. Does the UK Government, in a post-Fukushima world, want to expend the political resources necessary to ensure a large nuclear power construction programme? The UK Government, like others around the world, currently have a lot on their plates. Investment in wind power is in fact a (politically) safer and certainly more knowable bet than nuclear power. It is still possible that policy may allow at least part achievement of the ambition of announcements made in the latter days of the Labour Government for renewables in general and offshore wind power in particular (Toke 2011). However, the dampening effects of economic recession may yet take their toll.
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